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 Abstract 
Economic inequality has a robust negative effect on a range of important societal outcomes, 
including health, wellbeing, and education. Yet, it remains insufficiently understood why, 
how, and by whom unequal systems tend to be perpetuated.  In two studies we examine 
whether psychological mindsets adopted by the wealthy and the poor in their micro-social 
transactions act to perpetuate or challenge inequality. We hypothesized that occupying a 
wealthier socio-economic position promotes the pursuit of self-interest and contributes to 
inequality maintenance; poorer socio-economic position, on the other hand, should 
promote the pursuit of fairness and equality restoration. In Study 1, participants completed 
an Ultimatum Game as proposers after being primed to believe they are wealthier or 
poorer, offering money to either poor or wealthy responders. As expected, the wealthy 
pursued their self-interest and the net effect of this behavior contributes to the 
maintenance of inequality. Conversely, the poor pursued fairness and the net effect of this 
behavior challenges inequality. In Study 2, participants were responders deciding whether 
to accept or reject unfair distributions. Compared to the wealthier, the poorer challenged 
inequality by rejecting unequal offers. The links between micro-social processes and macro-
societal inequality are discussed. 
 
Word count: 192 
Keywords: Inequality, Class, Intergroup Relations, Ultimatum game.  
 
 
To understand cross-national differences in quality and duration of life, researchers 
have focused on differences in economic inequality. The literature on this topic is vast and 
convergent: Inequality has a robust negative impact at the personal, social, and societal 
level (see Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009 for an overview). At the physical level, the citizens of 
unequal societies are more likely to be ill, obese, and abuse drugs (Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2006). Inequality also undermines wellbeing, making people less happy (Oishi, Kesebir, & 
Diener, 2011) and more self-aggrandizing (Loughnan et al., 2011). At the societal level, 
inequality tears the social fabric. People in unequal societies tend to withdraw from others 
and trust them less (Oishi et al., 2011; Uslaner, 2004), as well as be less honest themselves 
(Neville, 2012). In short, personal and social functioning is compromised in unequal 
societies.  
 Despite the multilateral damage caused by inequality, the last few decades have 
witnessed a steady increase in levels of inequality across most countries in the world (OECD, 
2015). Economists, sociologists, and public health scientists have examined the causes of 
widespread inequality, pointing to a complex interplay of factors such as rate of economic 
growth, governmental policies, taxation, technological change, and access to education (for 
overviews, see Neckerman & Torche, 2007; Piketty, 2014; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
However, psychological processes may play an important, previously unrecognized role in 
maintaining inequality. Occupying a certain position in the socio-economic hierarchy may 
act as a mindset that systematically alters the way people approach resources distribution in 
their everyday transactions. If there are distinct strategies adopted by the wealthy and the 
poor in their micro-level transactions, these may perpetuate or challenge the macro-level 
distribution of resources.  
Given that economic inequality benefits the wealthy rather than the poor, the 
wealthy may be less inclined to change the status quo. Moreover, although inequality 
generates harmful effects for society as a whole, the wealthy tend to be less susceptible to 
its costs (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). Therefore, we might expect that wealthier individuals 
are more tolerant of inequality and in micro-social financial transactions focus on 
maximizing their gains rather than re-distributing resources. If occupying higher ranks of the 
socio-economic hierarchy favors gain maximization and comes with political power, it may 
sustain and even deepen existing inequality. 
By contrast, the poor may challenge inequality for at least two reasons: costs and 
perceived fairness. The costs of economic inequality burden the shoulders of the poor. Not 
only do they have less wealth, but they typically live shorter (Marmot et al., 1991; WHO, 
2008), unhappier lives (Oishi et al., 2011). Compounding these material costs, inequality 
generates symbolic costs through unfavorable social comparisons, both at an interpersonal 
and at an intergroup level. These may generate stress and anxiety (Bratanova, Loughnan, 
Klein, Claassen, & Wood, 2015; Kunz-Ebrect, Kirschbaum, Marmot, & Steptoe, 2004; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) and be detrimental to self-esteem (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In 
addition, the poor may perceive economic inequality as fundamentally unfair. Oishi et al. 
(2011) showed a robust relationship between perceived fairness and economic inequality 
for poorer Americans; the poor view rising inequality as increasingly unfair. By contrast, 
wealthier Americans show no link between economic inequality and perceived fairness; 
rising inequality does not appear increasingly unfair to the rich. Fairness and justice are 
foundational, widely endorsed moral values (Haidt, 2007). Violations of fairness are likely to 
elicit anger and a desire to restore justice (Haidt, 2003). If the poor perceive inequality as 
costly and unfair, then in micro-social transactions they may challenge inequality by re-
distributing wealth and rejecting unfair distributions.  
To examine micro-social transactions in the context of macro-economic position, we 
adopted the Ultimatum game paradigm (Güth & Tietz, 1990).  The Ultimatum game is a 
widely used economic game for examining income maximization and fairness (for a review 
see Bearden, 2001). In this paradigm participants assigned to the role of a proposer are 
given a sum of money to split between themselves and a responder. If the responder 
accepts the amount offered, both players keep their share as divided by the proposer; if the 
responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. Two competing motives have 
been identified as underlying decision making in the Ultimatum game: concern for fairness 
and concern for self-interest (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer & Fehr, 2006). Acting 
with self-interest typically undermines concerns for fairness, and vice versa. Physically 
suppressing the right dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPC) – an area associated with 
fairness implementation – through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) leads to the 
increased rates of acceptance of unfair offers by responders (Knoch et al., 2006). This 
behavior maximizes selfish gains but fails to enforce norms of fairness. Conversely, 
increasing the salience of fairness has been shown to significantly increase the rejection of 
unfair offers (Zhou & Wu, 2011). Therefore, we may expect fairness concerns and selfish 
gain maximization to have different influences on Ultimatum game behavior.  
Based on the preceding analysis, we expect that priming people to feel wealthier 
than others would strengthen the motive to pursue self-interest and undermine concerns 
for fairness. By contrast, when people feel poorer the motive to observe fairness and 
restore equality is expected to be more influential, even at the cost of self-interest. We test 
these hypotheses from the perspective of the proposer and responder in two studies.   
Study 1 
This study examined whether feeling wealthier or poorer influences how people 
propose to distribute wealth. Using the Ultimatum game paradigm (Güth & Tietz, 1990), 
people primed to feel poor or wealthy were asked to distribute money between themselves 
and a responder. Importantly, the responders were described as either wealthier or poorer 
than average. Because the Ultimatum game involves interdependence between players, a 
strategic approach to gain maximization requires the likelihood of the responder rejecting 
unfair offers to be estimated. The background of the responder can serve as a cue for this 
estimation (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000): poor people may be seen as having greater 
need for money, and therefore more likely to accept unfair offers. Wealthy responders, on 
the other hand, may be seen as more likely to reject unfair offers as they can afford to lose 
their share.  Thus, we expect that people pursuing gain maximization would offer less than 
fair share to the poor and a fair share to the wealthy. If the wealthy chronically adopt a 
strategic gain maximization approach in their micro-social transactions, this would maintain 
and deepen inequality by concentrating wealth.  
Conversely, if poorer proposers are primarily concerned with fairness rather than 
gain maximization, they should offer a fair share to the poor and less than fair share to the 
wealthy. If the poor chronically adopt fairness restoration approach in their micro-social 
transactions, this would challenge inequality by re-distributing wealth. In short, we expect 
that people who feel poorer will act to challenge inequality, whereas people who feel 
wealthier will act to maintain inequality.  
Method 
Participants were U.S. residents recruited via a job website (Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk). A job website provides a suitable naturalistic setting for studying micro-social 
transactions as it increases the salience of financial outcomes. Recent analysis of Mechanical 
Turk data quality revealed that it is at least as high as the quality of data collected via 
traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).   Nevertheless, a major 
disadvantage of studies conducted online is the lack of control over the immediate 
environment.  Participation requires only Internet access, and therefore studies may take 
place in settings with varying levels of distraction. In the absence of any means of 
controlling the immediate environment, various strategies have been recommended for 
screening data and identifying careless responses (e.g., Meade & Craig, 2012). Amongst 
these strategies are the use of items designed to check whether participants carefully 
followed the instructions and paid attention to key information. Since the hypotheses tested 
in the current studies heavily relied on participants understanding the pay-off matrix, 
recalling the responder’s background, and following instructions, we included items 
checking whether these conditions were fulfilled.  
Although every effort was made to convey the task instructions clearly, sixty-nine 
out of the 159 participants who completed the study were excluded from the analysis for 
either failing to follow instructions (specifically, not writing how they felt wealthier than 
others, n=7), misunderstanding the pay-offs (n=12) or failing to recall the responders’ 
economic background (n=50: 28 in the poorer proposer condition and 22 in the wealthier 
proposer condition)1. Two participants were excluded for making offers more than three 
standard deviations from the mean offer of their condition, leaving 88 participants (42 
females, Mage=33.83, SD=12.05). All participants who correctly completed the pay-off matrix 
and recalled the economic background of the responder received $US0.30.  
Participants completed all tasks online. First they were presented with information 
designed to frame their economic situation. They were randomly assigned to either the 
wealthier or poorer proposer condition. Participants in the wealthier condition read the 
following sentences describing poverty in America: “Poverty is deepening in the US society. 
Last year a third of the Americans took home as little as 5 percent of the wealth produced in 
the society.  Among them, an estimated 50 million people experienced hunger at various 
times during the year, including 17 million children.” This information was designed to make 
the participants feel relatively wealthy by eliciting a contrast effect (cf. Mussweiler, 2003; 
Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Kletner, 2010). Participants in the poorer condition read a 
paragraph describing extreme wealth in America: “Despite the financial crisis, many 
Americans are increasing their wealth. Last year the top earners took home 49 percent of 
the wealth produced in the society.  Many of these people own multi-million dollar homes, 
drive expensive cars, and enjoy holidays in tropical destinations.” This information was 
designed to make participants feel relatively poor. After reading the paragraphs, 
participants were asked to write a few sentences on how they are wealthier or poorer than 
many people in their society. Then they completed two manipulation check items; “I am 
deprived in material wealth”, “I am relatively advantaged in material wealth” on a seven-
point scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree). These ratings were highly correlated, 
r(88)=-.83, and so deprivation was reserved coded and the scores were averaged.  
Following this task, participants were introduced to a money distribution activity, 
which was patterned after the standard Ultimatum game. All participants were told they 
were randomly assigned the role of the proposer. Their task was to divide $1 between 
themselves and a responder. They were told that if the responder accepts the offer, they 
would receive the money as it was proposed. However, if the responder rejected the offer, 
both players would receive nothing. Moreover, they were told that they will be matched 
with a responder who was either poorer or wealthier than average. After dividing the sum 
as they wished, participants were asked to recall the economic background of their 
responder from three options: poorer than average, middle class, wealthier than average. 
They were also asked to complete items checking their comprehension of the pay-offs for 
both parties if the responder accepted or rejected their offer.   
Finally, participants completed demographic questions, including two items 
measuring subjective wealth, in terms of finances and assets, on a scale ranging from 0 to 
100. Since these items were highly correlated (r(88)=.71), they were collapsed into a single 
score.  
Results 
As expected, the manipulation shifted perceived wealth in the anticipated direction. 
People in the poorer condition (Mp=3.07, SDp=1.53) felt less wealthy than people in the 
wealthier condition (Mw=5.19, SDw=1.09), t(86)=7.56, p<.001. Further, participants in the 
poorer condition reported significantly lower subjective wealth (Mp=35.04, SDp=17.71) than 
participants in the wealthier condition (Mw=52.04, SDw= 17.78), t(86)=4.49, p<.001. The 
overall average was 43.15, indicating that participants believed they were on average lower-
middle class.  
To examine the impact of proposer and responder wealth on offers, we performed a 
2(proposer: poorer vs. wealthier) x 2(responder: poorer vs. wealthier) ANOVA. As expected, 
this analysis revealed a significant interaction, F(3,83)=9.26, p=.003, ηp2=.10. Given the 
violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance (Levene’s test p<0.001), adjusted t-
tests were employed for subsequent analyses2. These revealed that poorer proposers 
offered significantly more money to poorer (M=.50, SD=.05) than to wealthier responders 
(M=.43, SD=.14), t(30.60)=2.50, p=.018,Cohen’s d=.72. Conversely, wealthier proposers 
offered more money to wealthier (M=.51, SD= .02) than to poorer responders (M=.44, 
SD=.14), t(24.83)=2.26, p=.033, Cohen’s d=.66 (see Figure 1). 
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Discussion 
The findings of this study shed light on how inequalities in wealth are maintained by 
the wealthy and challenged by the poor. The hypothesized pursuit of differential priorities in 
micro-social transactions provides a plausible explanation. Poorer proposers challenged 
systems of inequality by offering unequal distributions to the wealthy. This was not a selfish 
maximization by poorer proposers – they offered equal distributions to poorer responders.  
This distinction between offers made to poorer and wealthier responders indicates that 
poorer proposers are acting to restore fairness by challenging the status of the wealthy, 
rather than simply trying to offset their relative poverty by maximizing their outcomes. By 
offering the wealthy less than fair distributions, while treating the poor fairly, poorer 
proposers challenged their position in society through micro-social transactions.  
In contrast, when people were induced to feel wealthier, they offered significantly 
less money to poorer than wealthier responders. Examination of the means suggests that 
wealthier proposers were offering fair distributions to wealthier responders and less than 
fair distributions to poorer responders. This may have been guided by a strategic pursuit of 
profit maximization in the context of interdependence:  poorer responders may have been 
perceived as less likely to reject unfair distributions and lose the amount offered than 
wealthier responders.  
It is also possible that the findings are explained by ingroup favoritism, specifically 
ingroup fairness: both wealthier and poorer proposers offered fair distributions to 
responders of similar socio-economic standing.  Dissimilarity in socio-economic position may 
have served as a marker of out-group membership, alleviating the requirement to adhere to 
fairness principles typically required when dealing with members of the same group. The 
next study was in part designed to disentangle between the explanations based on group 
membership and differential priorities pursued in micro-social transactions. However, it is 
important to note that regardless of which of the two psychological mechanisms is in 
operation, the same net outcome emerges: inequality perpetuation for the rich, and 
challenge for the poor.  
Study 2 
Study 1 focused on the role of the proposer and revealed that wealthier proposers 
act in a way that maintains inequality whereas poorer proposers act in a way that challenges 
inequality. However, it did not reveal whether unfair offers are likely to be accepted or 
rejected by the responder. If poorer people challenge inequality they should additionally 
reject unequal offers. By contrast, if wealthier people are comfortable with inequality and 
oriented towards maximizing their wealth, they should be prepared to accept unequal 
offers. To test these predictions, we had participants play the role of the responder who 
received an unequal distribution. To specifically examine responses to unfair offers in the 
absence of group membership concerns, the socio-economic background of the ostensible 
proposer was not indicated. Furthermore, to differentiate between poorer responders 
challenging inequality and wealthier responders maximizing their outcomes, we included a 
control (equal) condition.  
Method 
One-hundred and sixteen participants from the U.S. were recruited online via 
Mechanical Turk. Of these, twenty-two failed to understand the pay-off matrix and one 
participant did not follow instructions (specifically, did not write how s/he felt wealthier 
than others). This left 93 participants for further analysis (49 females, Mage=36.04, 
SD=12.96). All participants who correctly completed the pay-off matrix were paid $0.30 for 
their participation with a bonus of $0.10 paid to those who accepted the offer.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the poorer, equal, or wealthier 
condition. The instructions for the wealthier and poorer conditions were the same as in 
Study 1. People in the equal condition were asked to think about how they were about as 
wealthy as many people in their society, and write a few sentences on how they are 
financially similar to others. Given the high correlation of manipulation checks in Study 1, 
participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement “I am deprived in 
material wealth”. Participants were then provided with the instructions for the Ultimatum 
game and told that they were randomly assigned to be the responder. They were informed 
that the proposer had divided $1 such that they were offered $0.10. Participants completed 
comprehension items checking whether they understood the pay-off for both parties. In 
particular, they were informed that if they decided to accept the offer, they would be 
credited with $0.10 in addition to their participation fee of $0.30. Then they indicated 
whether they accepted or rejected the offer.  
Results 
Consistent with Study 1, participants in the three conditions significantly differed in 
their perceived economic deprivation, F(2,90)=6.37, p=.003. Specifically, participants in the 
poorer condition (Mp=4.44, SDp=1.46) felt more deprived than both participants in the 
wealthier (Mw=3.00, SDw=1.69), p=.001, and in the equal conditions (Me=3.46, SDe=1.86), 
p=.024. The difference between the equal and wealthier conditions was non-significant 
(p=.288). The correlation between the two measures of subjective wealth was high 
(r(93)=.62, p<.001) and they were averaged. A one-way ANOVA revealed a marginally 
significant effect F(2,90)=2.81, p=.065. Post-hoc analysis showed that participants in the 
wealthier (M=47.23, SD=18.82) and the poorer (M=36.65, SD=17.95) conditions significantly 
differed (p=.023). The equal condition (M=.44.00, SD=19.81) did not significantly differ from 
poorer or wealthier (ps>.12). 
 To examine whether priming of economic position influenced rejection rates 
amongst responders, we compared the percentage of rejections in each condition. 
Participants in the poorer condition rejected the unfair offers more frequently (52.9%) 
compared to people in the wealthier condition (29.0%), and this difference was marginally 
significant, Pearson χ2=3.82, p=.051. Stated otherwise, when faced with a 10:90 split against 
them, people primed to feel poorer tended to reject the offer at much higher rate than 
people primed to feel wealthier, even though this outcome left them with nothing. 
Participants in the equal condition exhibited a rejection rate (35.7%) which was similar to 
the wealthier (29%), Pearson χ2=.30, p=.583, and dissimilar to the poorer (52.9%), although 
the difference did not reach significance, Pearson χ2=1.84, p=.175 (see Figure 2).    
[Figure 2 about here] 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 2 indicated decreased tolerance of inequality amongst the 
poor. Even though the result was marginally significant, the magnitude of 23.9% difference 
in rejections rates between poorer and wealthier responders revealed that poorer 
responders’ were far less tolerant of unequal distributions that disadvantage them. The 
rejection rate exhibited by the wealthier responders was similar to that in the equality 
condition, indicating that the difference between the poorer and wealthier responders was 
primarily driven by high rejection rates amongst the poorer. Unlike in Study 1, these findings 
were obtained in a transaction setting where the ostensible proposer’s socio-economic 
position was unclear to responders, and it is therefore unlikely that ingroup favoritism 
underpinned the results.  
 That poorer people are more likely to reject unequal offers may appear puzzling; if 
they are poorer, why not accept whatever they are offered? We suggest that feeling poorer 
makes fairness concerns a more salient motive than self-interest for decisions on micro-
social transactions (Knoch et al., 2006). Receiving a grossly unfair offer in a state of 
heightened concern for fairness may have elicited a stronger emotional reaction in poorer 
respondents, leading to higher rejection rates (Haidt, 2003; van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, 
Aleman, 2006; Yamagishi, et al., 2009). Thus, poorer responders may reject unequal offers 
as a means of challenging inequality which they perceive as profoundly unfair (Oishi et al., 
2011). Rather than accept some benefit from an unequal distribution, poorer responders 
were more inclined to ensure that nobody received any wealth. The net effect of a micro-
social rejection of unequal distributions may serve to challenge a system premised on the 
disadvantaged accepting unfair offers.  
 Even though the pattern of results is consistent with previously established links 
between socio-economic position, concern for fairness, emotional response to unfair offers, 
and rejections rates within the Ultimatum Game paradigm, the small size of the stake (i.e., 
$0.10) may be seen as a limitation to the external validity of the finding. In particular, one 
may wonder whether the pattern of results would remain the same if the stakes are higher.  
 Issues concerning stake size have long been recognized as a challenge for the 
external validity not only of the current study, but for all findings obtained within the 
Ultimatum Game (for an overview, see Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). Researchers have 
therefore set out to examine whether the size of the stake matters, and what should be the 
magnitude of the sum offered such that even grossly unfair offers are accepted by 
respondents (see Andersen, Ertaç, Gneezy, Hoffman, & List, 2011; Cameron, 1999; Muniera 
& Zaharia 2002; Slonim & Roth, 1998). Contrary to common intuition, several studies have 
found that respondents do not markedly change their behavior as the stakes increase 
(Cameron, 1999; Muniera & Zaharia 2002; Slonim & Roth, 1998), even when they reached 
the equivalent of three months wage (Cameron, 1999). Part of the problem in establishing 
the precise effect of the stake in these studies was that proposers tended to adhere to 
broadly fair offers. In a recent study conducted in India, Andersen and colleagues (2011) 
controlled the percentage offered and utilized stakes amounting to the average wage for 2h 
(20 rupee), 1 day (100 rupee), 2 days (200 rupees), a month (2,000 rupee), and a year 
(20,000 rupee). These authors found that for offers under 20%, rejection rate was 
approximately 40% when the stake was relatively small (up to 200 rupee). This finding is 
broadly consistent with the equal and wealthier respondent conditions in our study. 
Rejection rates fell to approximately 25% when the stake was a month worth of salary (2000 
rupee). Only about 3% of the respondents rejected offers lower than 20% when the stake 
was very high (20, 000 rupee). In other words, while stakes indeed change respondents’ 
tendency to reject unfair offers, this change occurs only when the stakes are very high 
indeed. In the current study the $0.10 offer comprised 33% of the fee for participation. 
Although small in absolute terms, the benefit of accepting an unfair offer would have 
resulted in a substantial increase in payment for our participants. Therefore, while 
generalizations based on this finding should be made with care, the current results seem not 
to differ from the typical findings obtained within the Ultimatum Game.  
General Discussion 
The findings of the current study point to ways in which unequal societies are both 
maintained and challenged. Making people feel wealthier appears to prime the pursuit of 
self-interest and pushes them towards micro-social transactions that maintain and deepen 
inequality by concentrating the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor. By contrast, 
making people feel poorer appears to prime the pursuit of fairness and pushes them 
towards distributions of wealth that challenge inequality by benefiting the poor relative to 
the rich and rejecting unequal distributions.  
In the absence of corrective mechanisms inequality rapidly increases (Neckerman & 
Torche, 2007; Piketty, 2014). There are many causes of this process – financial (e.g., 
investment returns), political (e.g., flat taxation), and socio-demographic (e.g., unequal 
access to education). The current study suggests that psychological mechanisms are also at 
play. In particular, wealthier people may tend to pursue personal gain and be less concerned 
about fairness. In situation of interdependent micro-social transactions this proclivity can 
take the form of offering unfair distributions to the poor and being inclined to tolerate 
unfair distributions themselves. This willingness to endorse and tolerate inequality could 
serve to consolidate wealth in the hands of the few. Since the wealthy typically have the 
resources to be divided in society, if left unfettered such a bias may lead to an increase in 
inequality, further deepening the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged. In line 
with this reasoning, charity donation research revealed that poorer citizens give nearly 5 
times ($9.34 billion) more than the wealthy ($1.93billion) to causes aimed at alleviating 
poverty and meeting basic needs (The Center of Philanthropy, 2007; for a similar findings 
see Jones & Posnett, 2001).   
 Our findings also suggest that the poor are prepared to challenge and reject 
inequality, even when it is not in their immediate self-interest to do so. The precise reasons 
for this rejection are currently unclear. By rejecting unequal offers, the poor may 
communicate that such inequality is unacceptable. Another possibility is that the poor are 
responding with anger to the perceived injustice of an unfair distribution. From previous 
research it is clear that poor people view inequality as unjust (Oishi et al., 2011) and that 
injustice evokes anger (Haidt, 2003), which may motivate the desire to punish an unfair 
proposer. The emotional tone evoked by inequality may countermand the rational 
acceptance of unequal distributions (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, Aleman, 2006; 
Yamagashi et al., 2009).  
 At least two alternative psychological explanations of the current findings could be 
offered; system justification and ingroup favouritism. Both theories help explain the 
differential division of resources in society, and both play out at every level of the social 
gradient. We believe, however, that both offer weaker explanations of the current findings 
than concerns for self-interest and fairness.  
System justification theory argues that people are motivated to bolster and defend 
the status quo (for a review see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Importantly, this endorsement 
of the status quo is strong, perhaps even stronger, amongst people at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy. At first blush our research may seem to fit with system justification theory 
– especially for wealthier participants. However, poorer participants clearly do not support 
the status quo and act to challenge it through both resource distribution (Study 1) and 
refusing to accept unfair offers (Study 2). Combined, these responses indicate that the poor 
wish to reverse inequality and refuse to accept a position of poverty; both indicating an 
unwillingness to support the status quo. This finding is consistent with the findings of Brandt 
(2013) whose analyses of representative international datasets found no support for the 
claim that the disadvantaged support the status quo, contrary to what could be predicted by 
system justification theory. In addition to showing a challenge to unequal systems by the 
poor, our studies provide experimental evidence that this group acts against system 
justification concerns. Wealthier participants in Study 1, however, act in a system justifying 
manner; they share wealth with the wealthy and deny wealth to the poor, perpetuating 
economic inequality. Yet, in Study 2 they accept unfair offers which would mean a reversal 
of inequality. Looking across both studies, it appears that the wealthy are less interested in 
maintaining the economic order and rather seek to maximize their self-interest 
 Alternatively, one may suggest that these studies simply demonstrate the well-
established phenomenon of ingroup favouritism. Although this may explain the finding that 
both poorer and wealthier participants provide fairer offers to people of the same economic 
position, it has more difficulty accounting for the findings of Study 2. In Study 2 we 
deliberately did not reveal the economic status of the proposer, eliminating explicit 
intergroup comparison. Further, the independent variable, manipulation check, and 
dependent variable were all self-focused rather than group-focused. Finally, it is difficult to 
see how wealthy people accepting unfair offers serves to favour their ingroup. If the 
wealthy, as a group, accepted unfair divisions of wealth they would rapidly lose their 
economic rank. Ultimately, although we do not believe it fits these findings, an ingroup 
favouritism explanation would nevertheless indicate a mechanism via which unequal 
systems are challenged or perpetuated.        
 In sum, the current paper maps micro-social processes that may both sustain and 
challenge economic inequality. The rich tend to get richer; offering unequal distributions to 
the poor and accepting unequal distributions that increase their wealth. By contrast, the 
poor get even; offering unequal distributions to the rich and rejecting unequal distributions 
even if it costs them. It appears that perceived differences in socio-economic standing 
create a tension in micro-social transactions; the wealthy act to maintain inequality, the 
poor to challenge it.   
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Footnotes: 
1 Due to the high number of excluded participants, to reduce the likelihood of Type I error 
we conducted the substantive analyses reported in the Results section using the whole 
sample from which only the extreme (beyond +/-3SDs) outliers were excluded (cf. Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The obtained results were comparable to those reported after 
the exclusion of the 69 participants. The 2(proposer: poorer vs. wealthier) x 2(responder: 
poorer vs. wealthier) ANOVA analysis revealed a significant interaction, 
F(3,149)=6.58,p=.011,ηp2=.042. As in the main analysis, a Levine’s test revealed a violation of 
the assumption of homogeneity (p≤.001) in both the wealthier and poorer proposer 
conditions. Adjusted independent-samples t-test further showed that poorer proposers 
offered significantly more money to poorer (M=.49, SD=.05) than to wealthier responders 
(M=.44, SD=.12), t(48.44)=2.61, p=.012. As in the main analysis, wealthier proposers offered 
more money to wealthier (M=.49, SD= .07) than to poorer responders (M=.46, SD= .11), 
although the difference did not reach significance, t(64.84)=1.07,p=.289. These findings 
show that the exclusion of participants who did not follow the instructions accurately 
affected the significance but not the pattern of results.  
2 The same pattern of results was also obtained via non-parametric logit analysis.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure Captions: 
Figure 1. Offers as a function of proposers’ and responders’ socio-economic position. The 
error bars represent the standard error of the mean in each condition. 
Figure 2. Rejection rate as a function of responders’ socio-economic position. 
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